AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMARY DRIVER FOR CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE—SECURITY VERSUS ECONOMICS by Whitman, Jamie N.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2018-09
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMARY DRIVER FOR
CHINAS BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVESECURITY
VERSUS ECONOMICS
Whitman, Jamie N.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/60362
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.








AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMARY DRIVER FOR 
CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE—SECURITY 
VERSUS ECONOMICS 
by 
Jamie N. Whitman 
September 2018 
Thesis Advisor: Michael A. Glosny 
Second Reader: Feroz H. Khan 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 September 2018  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Master's thesis 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMARY DRIVER FOR CHINA’S BELT AND 
ROAD INITIATIVE—SECURITY VERSUS ECONOMICS 
 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
  
 6. AUTHOR(S) Jamie N. Whitman 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)     
 China portrays the Belt and Road Initiative—an interconnected network of rail lines, oil and gas 
pipelines, roads, bridges, and port facilities designed to connect China with Central Asia, the Middle East, 
Africa, and Europe—as an effort aimed at regional economic integration with win-win outcomes for every 
country involved. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project of the Belt and 
Road Initiative, consisting of rail lines, fiber optic cables, power plants, and the Gwadar Port facility. CPEC 
provides the most tangible infrastructure projects to evaluate. Critics argue that it is a Chinese neocolonial 
effort to exert Chinese influence and increase Chinese power globally, burdening poor and developing 
countries with dangerous amounts of debt. Chinese internal and external security concerns, such as violence 
in Xinjiang and the perceived “Malacca Dilemma,” are also discussed as important drivers for the Belt and 
Road Initiative and CPEC. This thesis examines both economic and security arguments to address the 
question: What is the primary driver for China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the China–Pakistan Economic 
Corridor? The research shows that security is the primary driver for these projects. Economic considerations 
and benefits are also important to Chinese leaders, but security considerations trump economic ones. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
BRI, Belt and Road, One Belt One Road, Belt and Road Initiative, Maritime Silk Road, 
String of Pearls, OBOR, CPEC, China, Pakistan, China Pakistan Economic Corridor 
 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 89 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMARY DRIVER FOR CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD 
INITIATIVE—SECURITY VERSUS ECONOMICS 
Jamie N. Whitman 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
BA, Eastern Washington University, 2006 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
September 2018 
Approved by: Michael A. Glosny 
 Advisor 
 Feroz H. Khan 
 Second Reader 
 Mohammed M. Hafez 
 Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 China portrays the Belt and Road Initiative—an interconnected network of rail 
lines, oil and gas pipelines, roads, bridges, and port facilities designed to connect China 
with Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe—as an effort aimed at regional 
economic integration with win-win outcomes for every country involved. The 
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project of the Belt and Road 
Initiative, consisting of rail lines, fiber optic cables, power plants, and the Gwadar Port 
facility. CPEC provides the most tangible infrastructure projects to evaluate. Critics argue 
that it is a Chinese neocolonial effort to exert Chinese influence and increase Chinese 
power globally, burdening poor and developing countries with dangerous amounts of 
debt. Chinese internal and external security concerns, such as violence in Xinjiang and 
the perceived “Malacca Dilemma,” are also discussed as important drivers for the Belt 
and Road Initiative and CPEC. This thesis examines both economic and security 
arguments to address the question: What is the primary driver for China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor? The research shows that security is 
the primary driver for these projects. Economic considerations and benefits are also 
important to Chinese leaders, but security considerations trump economic ones. 
v 
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In 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI),1 an interconnected network of rail lines, oil and gas pipelines, roads, bridges, and 
port facilities designed to connect China with Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and 
Europe.2 The BRI is funded mostly by China and Chinese investors through loans or grants 
from the Silk Road Fund and the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), both of 
which were created specifically for or in part for this initiative.3 As of October 2017, 
approximately US$300 billion have already been invested in BRI initiatives, with an 
additional US$700 billion worth of investment expected in the next 10 years.4   
A key element of BRI is the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), an 
infrastructure-building campaign in Pakistan, which began in 2015 with an estimated 
US$46 billion dollars’ worth of investment, but increased to US$51.1 billion.5 It includes 
port facilities at Gwadar Port, roads, and pipelines.6 CPEC will span from Kashgar in the 
Chinese province of Xinjiang, to Gwardar port in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan.7 
                                                 
1 The Belt and Road Initiative is the latest term in a series of terms to describe China’s global 
infrastructure building and trade initiative. Other terms used are One Belt, One Road (OBOR), the 
Maritime Silk Road, the Economic Belt, the Silk Road Economic Belt, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road. While this list is not all encompassing, these terms are often used interchangeably and are used to 
describe the same phenomena. The term Belt and Road Initiative is the most recent term used by China and 
will be used throughout this thesis. 
2 “Chronology of China’s “Belt and Road” initiatives,” Xinhuanet, February 5, 2015, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-02/05/c_133972101.htm; Scott Kennedy, “Building China’s 
One Belt, One Road,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 3, 2015, https://www.csis.org/
analysis/building-china’s-”one-belt-one-road”; Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on 
the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative,” China Leadership Monitor. 47 (July 2015): 2, 
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm47ms.pdf. 
3 Swaine, 3.  
4 Anja Manuel, “How China is Quietly Reshaping the World,” The Atlantic, October 17, 2017, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/china-belt-and-road/542667/. 
5 Abdur Rehman, “How CPEC Security Will Test the ‘All-Weather Friendship’ of China and 
Pakistan,” The Diplomat, June 24, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/how-cpec-security-will-test-the-
all-weather-friendship-of-china-and-pakistan/. 
6 Muhammad Diam Fazil, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Potential and Vulnerabilities,” 




The Karakorum Highway was completed in 1979 and is slated to be widened and improved 
as part of CPEC.8 Several wind and coal-fired power production facilities have been built 
to address widespread have been completed to help address chronic power shortages in 
Pakistan.9  
However, CPEC is the newest and greatest manifestation of the long-term Sino-
Pakistan economic cooperation. Pakistan was among the first countries, and the first 
Muslim country, to recognize Communist China as the legitimate government of a 
mainland China.10 Their relationship has been consistently characterized as “sweeter than 
honey, “deeper than the deepest ocean,” and “all-weather friends.”11 The first and most 
important joint infrastructure-building project was the Karakorum Highway (KKH), a 
stretch of road reaching heights of 15, 397 feet between China and Pakistan that has become 
the central land artery between the two countries.12 Taking over 27 years to build, over 
1,000 Chinese and Pakistani workers died building the KKH, which has become a symbol 
of the solidity of relations between the two.13 Although not originally planned as part of a 
greater network, the KKH has been integrated into the greater CPEC plan.  
What is China’s motivation for CPEC and the BRI? Two main arguments emerge 
- security and economic. The economic argument is focused on China’s desire to move up 
the production value chain, escape the middle income trap, and maintain access to markets 
globally. The security argument focuses on China’s “soft underbelly” of the southwestern 
provinces, its increased spending on internal security, the perceived “Malacca Dilemma,” 
                                                 
8 “CPEC Projects Progress Update,” Government of Pakistan, November 29, 2017, http://cpec.gov.pk/
progress-update. 
9 Ibid.; Drazen Jorgic, “Pakistani PM Rushes to End Energy Shortages Ahead of 2018 Poll,” Reuters, 
October 9, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-power-politics/pakistan-pm-rushes-to-end-
energy-shortages-ahead-of-2018-poll-idUSKCN12A030 
10 Andrew Small, The China Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (Haryana, India: Penguin 
Random House India), 19. 
11 Ibid., 3. 
12 Ibid., xv, 99. 
13 Ibid., 99. 
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and a desire to spread its influence globally. While economic performance is increasingly 
important to Chinese leaders, the desired ends is security. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND MAIN FINDINGS 
What drives China’s Belt and Road Initiative? Is it economic, driven by China’s 
desire and need to continue economic growth? Or is the BRI driven by China’s need to 
maintain a firm grip on the southwestern provinces and perceived external security threats? 
Examining where China invests for these projects gives insights to the motivations. If the 
BRI and CPEC were purely economically driven as China claims, then Beijing would be 
investing in countries with investable grade credit ratings and where they would likely 
receive a safe return on investment. However, China is investing in countries with high 
risks of default on loans and who have credit ratings below investable grade, according to 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), notably Pakistan, 
Venezuela, and Argentina.14 These high risk investments can threaten the viability of 
CPEC and BRI projects in the near and long term, as well as threaten to overburden the 
Chinese and recipient country’s economy with non-performing loans and debt.15 This 
analysis of where China is investing points to a different driver, that of security concerns.  
The thrust of BRI out of China is focused on the southwest frontiers, an area which 
China has historically felt a shaky grip on power and an area China views as its “soft 
underbelly.”16 Xinjiang, as well as Pakistan are of concern to Beijing as unrest and a shift 
in Uighur sentiment from secular to Islamist in Xinjiang is linked to Pakistan.17 An 
unstable Pakistan poses an increasing risk to China, not only because they share a border, 
but China perceives that Uighurs have and are traveling to Pakistan for radicalization and 
then return to Xinjiang and perpetuate acts of violence.18 Xi Jinping said that religious 
                                                 
14 “China rethinks developing world largesse as deals sour,” Financial Times, October 13, 2016, 
https://www.ft.com/content/5bf4d6d8-9073-11e6-a72e-b428cb934b78. 
15 Small, The China Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics, 15–16.  
16 Swaran Singh, “Rebuilding Lifelines of Its Soft Underbelly,” in The New Great Game, ed. Thomas 
Fingar, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), loc 398 of 799, iBooks. 
17 Small, 84–87. 
18 Ibid., 72, 176–177. 
4 
extremism is a direct threat to China, as extremists and separatists could flow into Xinjiang 
with a goal to weaken China.19 This focus on internal security was also included in Xi 
Jinping’s 19th Party Congress speech. Internal security spending by China totaled nearly 
US$200 billion in 2017, and while the largest amount of domestic security spending is 
focused on the Tibetan Autonomous Region, Xinjiang is second and saw a 92.8 percent 
increase  between 2017 and 2018.20  
Chinese leaders recognize that economic development since the Deng Xiaoping era 
has been uneven and has favored large coastal cities, and has left behind the interior and 
outlying provinces. China advertises that BRI will raise the standard of living in these areas 
and claims the BRI will address chronic underdevelopment. This desire to raise the 
standard of living for all Chinese citizens is based on a quest for security, to placate the 
ethnic minority populations living there, and to maintain a grip on power, rather than 
altruistic intentions.21 While economic benefits undoubtedly appeal to China, the ends are 
motivated by security considerations. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Belt and Road Initiative is arguably the most ambitious infrastructure building 
campaign in history. It crosses some of the most unstable countries in the world, whose 
governments are stymied by corruption, rent-seeking, and violence. China hopes to 
improve the economies of these states in order to decrease violence, prevent spillover into 
Chinese territory, and increase the standard of living in its southwestern frontier to promote 
internal stability. Whether or not BRI will succeed is unknown, however the China–
Pakistan Economic Corridor provides the opportunity for a case study. Pakistan is plagued 
by many of the same issues other BRI countries experience, such as corruption, ethnic 
                                                 
19 Christopher Ford, “Realpolitik with Chinese Characteristics: Chinese Strategic Culture and the 
Modern Communist Party-State,” in Strategic Asia 2016–2017: Understanding Strategic Cultures, ed. 
Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Willis, (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian 
Research), pg. 38. 
20 Adrian Zenz, “China’s Domestic Security Spending: An Analysis of Available Data,” Jamestown 
Foundation, China Brief, 18, Issue 4, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-domestic-security-spending-
analysis-available-data/ 
21 Singh, “Rebuilding Lifelines of Its Soft Underbelly,” in The New Great Game, loc. 355–357 of 799. 
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violence, and violent extremism. CPEC succeeding could provide China with a blueprint 
on how to succeed elsewhere. Yet, China’s motivation for BRI is debated, with some 
arguing the main driver is continued Chinese economic development and others arguing 
that security trumps all. 
Understanding the motivations for BRI and CPEC have implications for U.S. 
foreign policy, and may also illuminate potential areas of cooperation and conflict between 
the U.S. and China. Understanding these motivations could also reveal areas of strength 
and weakness in China’s calculus, and provide clues to areas in which the U.S. could 
exploit. The Chinese motivations also provide insight as to what Beijing views as most 
important for China, which helps the U.S. determine and shape its foreign policy.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Official Chinese media, such as Xinhua offers insight into Chinese thinking on 
topics such as the BRI, CPEC, and the “Made in China 2025” initiative, discussed in 
Chapter IV. Unofficial Chinese media, such as the South China Morning Post often offer 
differing views from the official party line in China, and often offer information or insight 
that deviates from Beijing’s from scholars, officials, and economists in China who 
otherwise would not speak to official media. Think tanks such as the Lowy Institute in 
Australia and the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, offer 
analysis by experts, as well as a Western view of the BRI and CPEC. The Center for 
Strategic and International Studies experts such as Johnathan Hillman testify before 
Congressional bodies focused on China, and thus reviewing such testimonies is important 
as it helps direct the United States government’s perceptions and actions vis-a-vis China. 
Andrew Small is arguably one of the top Sino-Pakistan scholars, and thus his work 
The China-Pakistan Axis Asia’s New Geopolitics has been reviewed at length. Several 
renowned scholars such as Michael Swaine, Robert Sutter, and Thomas Fingar have written 
on the Chinese Foreign Policy extensively. Fingar’s book, The New Great Game offers 
chapters from Western and non-Western authors, and focuses on China’s relations and 
foreign policy goals in South and Southeast Asia, which is important to review in regards 
to the maritime portion of the BRI. Swaine’s article China Leadership Monitor discussing 
6 
Chinese views on the BRI is of great value as it provides insight and analysis of official 
Chinese media and statements. Sutter’s book Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy 
Since the Cold War includes both Western and non-Western authors and provides insight 
into China’s foreign policy considerations.  
1. Belt and Road Overview 
In 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), an interconnected network or rail lines, oil and gas pipelines, roads, bridges, and 
port facilities designed to connect Chinese market with European markets, transiting 
Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.22 It is arguably the most ambitious and 
expansive infrastructure-building campaign in history. The BRI is funded mostly by China 
and Chinese investors through loans or grants from the Silk Road Fund and the Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), both of which were created specifically for or in 
part for this initiative.23 Foreign investors are also helping to fund BRI.24 The AIIB was 
formed in early 2014 to “finance infrastructure construction and promote regional 
interconnectivity and economic integration.”25 By the beginning of 2015, 25 countries 
signed on to the AIIB: China; Bangladesh; Brunei; Cambodia; Pakistan; India; Kazakhstan; 
Kuwait; Laos; Malaysia; Mongolia; Myanmar; Nepal; Oman; the Philippines; Qatar; 
Singapore; Sri Lanka; Thailand; Uzbekistan; Vietnam; New Zealand; Maldives; Saudi 
Arabia; and Tajikistan.26  The Silk Road Fund was established when China invested US$40 
billion, which President Xi announced would be used to “provide investment and financing 
support to carry out infrastructure, resources, industrial cooperation, financial cooperation 
and other projects related to connectivity for countries along the ‘Belt and Road.’”27 While 
estimates differ, approximately UD$300 billion have already been invested in BRI 
                                                 
22 Chronology of China’s “Belt and Road” initiatives, Xinhuanet; Scott Kennedy, “Building China’s 
One Belt, One Road;  Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative.” 
23 Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative,” 3. 
24 Ibid. 
25 “Chronology of China’s “Belt and Road” initiatives, Xinhuanet. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid. 
7 
initiatives, with an additional US$700 billion worth of investment expected in the next 
10 years.28  
While not specifically a function of the BRI initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) also serves as an economic and security cooperation forum, useful to 
China and other BRI countries. Originally composed of the “Shanghai Five” – China, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan – expanded in 2001 to include Uzbekistan 
and was rebranded as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.29 The SCO expanded to 
include India and Pakistan as members, along with Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and 
Mongolia as observers.30 The United States has been blocked by China from joining, even 
as an observer.31 Originally intended to prevent Russia or its predecessor the Soviet Union 
from dominating Central Asia, the SCO essentially allows Beijing to block U.S. hegemony 
in the Central Asian Republics.32 The SCO’s focus has evolved slightly over time, but one 
of its main focus is battling the “three evils” of separatism, religious extremism, and 
terrorism.33 While anti-terrorism and emergency exercises have been held between SCO 
countries militaries, its focus is on regional cooperation.34 The SCO’s focus has shifted in 
recent years to economic concerns, and in 2015 they released a 10-year development 
strategy in which economics was featured prominently and where a provision for 
“developing common approaches of the SCO member states” to the BRI.35  
                                                 
28 Anja Manuel, “How China is Quietly Reshaping the World.” 
29 Small, The China Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics, 76; “About SCO’, Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, December 1, 2017; Jonathan E. Hillman, India and Pakistan Join the Shanghai Club, 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies), June 8, 2017, https://www.csis.org/
analysis/india-and-pakistan-join-shanghai-club  
30 Ibid. 
31 Thomas Fingar, “China’s Goals in South Asia,” in The New Great Game, ed. Thomas Fingar, 
(Stanford, CA; Stanford University Press, 2016), loc. 141 of 799, iBooks. 
32 Ibid., loc. 146 of 799. 
33 Small, 76; Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War, 
Fourth Edition, (Lahnman, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016,) loc. 386 of 512, iBooks. 
34 Ibid., loc 385–386 of 512. 
35 Jonathan E. Hillman, India and Pakistan Join the Shanghai Club; “Development Strategy of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Until 2025,” Shanghai Cooperation Organization, accessed December 
4, 2017, http://eng.sectsco.org/load/200162/. 
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2. Previous Investment, China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, and BRI 
A key element of BRI is the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and 
relations between the two have been described as “sweeter than honey,” “deeper than the 
deepest ocean,” and “all-weather friends.”36 Pakistan was among the first countries, and 
the first Muslim country to recognize the People’s Republic of China.37 CPEC, as 
previously mentioned is not the first infrastructure initiative between China and Pakistan; 
the most notable of which is the Karakorum Highway (KKH). CPEC is another 
infrastructure-building campaign announced in 2015, which began with an estimated at 
US$46 billion dollars’ worth of investment, but increased to US$51.1 billion, and includes 
port facilities at Gwadar Port, roads, and pipelines.38 CPEC will span from Kashgar in the 
Chinese province of Xinjiang, to Gwardar port in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan.39 
Although recently unveiled, the bones of CPEC were laid in 1979, when China and 
Pakistan completed the Karakoram Highway (KKH)..40 Though this route claims only 
seven to eight percent of the trade between the two countries, it is symbolic of the long-
term relations between China and Pakistan, as well as China’s continued interest in 
investment in Pakistan.41 The China-Pakistan relationship is viewed curiously, as the two 
have seemingly very little in common, the exception being both have a contentious 
relationship with India. Yet China has a security interest in Pakistan, since it borders 
Xinjiang, where Uighur separatists have committed acts of terrorism and Pakistan is where 
some Chinese Uighurs are suspected of receiving terrorist training.42 
                                                 
36 Small, The China Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics, 3. 
37 Ibid., 19. 
38 Rehman, “How CPEC Security Will Test the ‘All-Weather Friendship’ of China and Pakistan.” 
39 Fazil, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Potential and Vulnerabilities.” 
40 Small, 70–71. 
41 Ibid., 100. 
42 Charles Wolf, Xiao Wang, Eric Warner, “China’s Foreign Aid and Government Sponsored 
Investment Activities: Scale, Content, Destinations, and Implications,’ RAND Corporation, (Santa Monica, 
CA,  RAND Corporation, 2013), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/
RR118//RAND_RR118.pdf  
9 
While China’s intended investment in CPEC has risen to over US$51 billion, little 
has been accomplished. KKH was completed in 1979, and is slated to be widened and 
improved as part of CPEC.43 The first phase of Gwadar Port has been completed, but not 
the second; a handful of wind turbine farms have been completed to help address chronic 
power shortages in Pakistan.44 Speculation exists on how much of the US$51.1 billion will 
actually be invested, as China has failed to follow through with investments in the past. A 
RAND Corporation study that detailed Chinese-pledged assistance to Pakistan over a 
decade between 2001 and 2011 at a value of US$66 billion, however only six percent of 
the investment actually came to fruition.45 Chinese and Pakistani efforts for CPEC have 
similarly been late bloomers. The most recent example is Gwadar Port, a port facility 
located in a restive Pakistani province that borders the Arabian Sea. The port opened in 
2007, with the intention of a second phase of the port construction to follow; this second 
phase would be oil terminals, cargo terminals, a roll-on/roll-off terminal, and a grain 
terminal.46 China was also to build an oil refinery at Gwadar as well, yet very little of this 
second phase has been built.47  
3. Chinese Motivations 
China’s motivations for the BRI are likely multifaceted, with President Xi making 
the initiative feature prominently in both foreign policy and domestic economic strategy.48 
Both the economic and the geopolitical benefits to China from this initiative are 
undeniable, but which is the primary driver is where scholarly discussion diverges. The 
economic argument focuses on the expected economic dividends to China once the BRI 
projects are put in place and begin to bear fruit. Such dividends would include markets to 
                                                 
Government of Pakistan,  “CPEC Projects Progress Update.”  
44 Government of Pakistan,  “CPEC Projects Progress Update”; Jorgic, “Pakistani PM Rushes to End 
Energy Shortages Ahead of 2018 Poll.”  
45 Small, The China Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics, 97. 
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offload excess capacity, markets for high-end Chinese goods, and the establishment of a 
Chinese-centric manufacturing model. Economic-focused arguments do not discount the 
geopolitical forces in play, nor disregard the implications to foreign policy that economics 
has.49 Some literature focuses on specific aspects of China’s economic interest that drives 
the BRI, while others focus on economics writ large. The geopolitical argument focuses on 
security; China views the southwest frontier provinces such as Xinjiang as its “soft 
underbelly.”50 The underdevelopment, ethnic and religious conflict, and remote locations 
of the five southwest frontier provinces is a partial motivation for the BRI, but the desire 
to increase the standard of living in those provinces isn’t the result of altruistic motives, 
rather it is based on a quest for security and to placate the people living there.51 
a. Economic Motivations 
The economic-focused argument has official backing, in respects to the official 
commission it was placed under. Beijing created an BRI oversight office, and placed it 
under the control of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which 
is China’s premier economic planning commission.52 The NDRC’s focus is on economic 
cooperation and global economic integration, and five goals are listed as part of the vision 
for BRI, including policy coordination, unimpeded trade, and facilities connectivity.53 
According to Peter Cai at the Lowy Institute, the economic aspect is overlooked; he argues 
that China is using the BRI to create regional economic integration in order to assert 
Chinese regional dominance, both in the Southwest frontiers and beyond.54 Within China, 
the southwestern provinces continually lag behind the eastern ones with per capita incomes 
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in these areas consistently fallen behind for the last six decades, which Beijing feels is a 
motivating factor for instability.55 Lu Shuling, the former Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, 
postulates that economic development provided by BRI and CPEC in China’s southwest 
frontiers, as well as regionally will help combat the primary driver of insurgency and 
separatism in Pakistan and Xinjiang, which is poverty.56 
Aside from the desire to promote economic growth internally, economic 
motivations extend outside China’s borders. As China’s economy has grown, wages within 
China have increased, thus costing China its manufacturing comparative advantages.57 
Stimulus packages during the global recession of 2008 has created excess capacity within 
China’s economy that it needs to offload, or risk economic crisis.58 China is also looking 
to create markets for higher-priced Chinese goods that the West is unlikely to buy; the 
Chinese also seek to be the standard bearers for BRI countries in areas like science and 
technology, as some Chinese sources think that “only companies that make standards can 
be considered world-class companies.”59 All of these elements support what is called 
“Made in China 2025,” a manufacturing industry upgrade push to restructure China’s 
manufacturing industry, make it more innovation-driven, and emphasize quality over 
quantity.60 The BRI is expected to play a prominent role in the exporting of higher-end 
Chinese goods..61 
Cai does note that there are some potential problem areas for China and the BRI 
countries. Some of the BRI countries have credit ratings below investable grade, and some 
Chinese banks are worried about risky loans to these countries as well as the long-term 
viability of some BRI projects.62 Some Chinese bankers are also worried that these massive 
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initiatives could create another global economic crisis, and worry that poorer countries 
could take advantage of China by getting loans for projects with no intention of repaying 
them.63 Simultaneously, former ambassador to Pakistan is claiming that the BRI is a “free 
ride on the Chinese economic express train,” which demonstrates the split between the two 
schools of thought.64 Pakistan is proving to be dangerous for Chinese overseas workers, 
which could also threaten the viability of the BRI projects in that country.65 
b. Security Motivations 
The security-focused argument for the BRI is focused on the southwest frontiers, 
separatism and violence in Xinjiang, and stability and economic viability of Pakistan and 
CPEC. To sustain economic growth, China needs consistent access to energy, which the 
Central Asian Republics have, and that Pakistan can provide via Gwadar Port.66 China’s 
emphasis on the SCO – which Pakistan recently became a member of – demonstrates that 
China believes it can only truly address the issues inside its borders by cooperating with 
regional states.67 Central Asia and Pakistan have been a source of training and support for 
militant Uighurs in Xinjiang.68 The Chinese Foreign Minister in 2015 stated that the BRI 
was the key focus of Chinese foreign policy.69 Thus, security is not the only geopolitical 
consideration or concern; China seeks to enhance its prestige, and will use the BRI to do 
so.70 By connecting the region together, financing massive infrastructure-building 
campaigns, and establishing itself as the standard setter, China will enhance its own 
economy as well as its regional and global prestige.  
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China has also announced it has set up courts within China to arbitrate BRI disputes, 
though it is unclear how these Chinese courts will overcome sovereignty issues that arise 
out of international law.71 The International Court of Arbitration for the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has offered its services to Beijing to arbitrate disputes.72 The 
ICC is an international business association with 6 million members in 100 countries, and 
is headquartered in Paris, France.73 It has not yet been announced if China will utilize the 
ICC’s Court of Arbitration. Should China continue to use internal courts to arbitrate may 
signal a desire to control not only the funding for BRI projects, but also the mechanism to 
determine outcomes of disputes so that they favor China. Such favoritism would not only 
help propel Chinese companies toward the goal of becoming members of “world-class 
companies”74 they so desire, but also would give China complete control over projects 
while giving BRI countries only a perceived arbitration mechanism. 
Certain areas covered by CPEC and BRI are especially important to China. Pakistan 
and Xinjiang are of particular concern to Beijing. Unrest in Xinjiang is linked, sometimes 
legitimately to Pakistan,75 which played a critical role in the shift of Uighur sentiment from 
mostly secular to Islamist in nature, according to Andrew Small.76 Many of the young 
Uighur men that traveled to Pakistan to seek religious education ended up funneled into 
madrassas that were hotbeds for extremist recruitment and radicalization.77 Coupled with 
a long-held desire by most Uighurs to establish an independent country, China feared an 
outbreak of extremist violence. Beginning in 2008, that is exactly what occurred; the 
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violence hit an apex in 2009, when at least 184 people were killed in clashes between 
Uighurs and the ethnic Han Chinese.78 
With China viewing the southwest frontier as their “soft underbelly,” the fears of 
internal instability, and the increase in violence in Xinjiang in the last decade, the security 
argument also holds significant influence.79  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are two schools of thought regarding explanations for Chinese motivations 
for BRI—economic and security. The security explanation focuses on the Southwest 
frontier region, with a specific focus on Xinjiang, as well as the Chinese concern regarding 
Pakistan. This focus on Xinjiang covers the entire array of Chinese interests and foreign 
policy worldwide, notably in South Asia due to the connection between Pakistan and 
Muslim Uighurs.80 A 2012 terror attack near the entrance to the Forbidden City, 
perpetuated by Uighurs who came from an area close to the Xinjiang-Pakistan border 
resulted in two deaths and 38 wounded embarrassed Chinese security services.81 This 
attack is one of many. 
An unstable Pakistan poses increasing risk to China, as China perceives that 
Uighurs have and are traveling to Pakistan for radicalization in order to return to Xinjiang 
and perpetuate acts of violence.82 Xi himself characterized religious extremism as a direct 
threat to China, as extremists and separatists could flow into Xinjiang in order to weaken 
China.83 It is not just the threat of Pakistani-trained militants that worries Beijing. Pakistan 
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has become an increasingly dangerous place to be a Chinese worker; in Baluchistan, 
Chinese workers have been harassed and killed by separatists in Baluchistan, but also by 
religious extremists.84 In 2004, the Baloch Liberation Army attacked Chinese workers who 
were building Gwadar Port, killing three and injuring nine, and also attacked the Gwadar 
airport and a hotel housing Chinese workers.85  In 2007, a group of vigilantes from the Red 
Mosque attacked a Chinese acupuncture clinic and massage parlor, taking workers and 
clients hostage, claiming it was used as a brothel.86 Such events show on an international 
scale that Beijing and Islamabad are incapable of protecting Chinese workers, 
embarrassing both governments. Pakistan often struggles to combat terrorism within its 
own borders, in part because of ties between organizations like the Pakistani Taliban, and 
the ISI Pakistan’s intelligence service.87 Beijing fears spillover of unrest and violence into 
Chinese territory. 
The importance of economic motivations cannot be overlooked. China has become 
a net importer of oil, which is a resource that is key to its economic advancement.88 China 
has lost its comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector as its economy has 
continued to grow.89 Beijing announced the Made in China 2025 initiative, which is 
focused on restructuring its manufacturing industry to emphasize innovative, quality 
manufacturing in place of quantity, low-cost manufacturing.90 China is anticipating that 
the BRI countries will be more willing to purchase higher-end, more expensive Chinese 
goods than Western countries.91 The infrastructure built by the BRI will help facilitate the 
movement of goods to and from China. This economic-focused approach is the basis 
behind the BRI push by Beijing. 
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The push for higher-end Chinese goods is not simply for monetary purposes. China 
sees the BRI as necessary to establish China as a standard-setter for manufacturing, 
technology, and science; by setting the standards for those industries, Chinese companies 
can become world-class companies and be more competitive internationally.92 China’s 
push for exporting its high-speed rail technology is an example of this, with China 
constructing high-speed rail projects in Laos, Thailand, and Indonesia.93 A compounding 
economic reason is China suffers from excess capacity in its manufacturing sectors, and 
the BRI countries are seen a possible relief valves for this excess.94 Beijing initiated a 
stimulus package during the 2008 global financial crisis in order to keep its economy afloat, 
which in turn exacerbated Chinese excess capacity.95 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
For this research question, I examine the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. This 
portion of the greater BRI is useful because large amounts of infrastructure already exist, 
and as such they can be studied for their longevity as well as the presence of additional 
literature, to include official Pakistani and Chinese press releases and information made 
available to the public. Studying already-existing infrastructure lessens the need for 
speculation and conjecture, and the CPEC currently has the most infrastructure already 
built. 
Various types of literature have been examined. Of particular interest is official and 
unofficial Chinese sources, to include statements made by Chinese government officials 
and the official news media outlet Xinhua. Other official sources, such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, and the official Government of Pakistan CPEC website are also 
available in English. Many think tanks, located around the world have extensive research 
and writings on the One Belt, One Road and China–Pakistan Economic Corridor initiatives, 
including the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Lowy Institute. Online 
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and print scholarly journals, such as Harvard University’s Hoover Institute China 
Leadership Monitor are available for research and are well-sourced. Several renowned 
scholars such as Andrew Small, Michael Swaine, Robert Sutter, and Thomas Fingar have 
written on the topic extensively. Combined, these sources provide breadth and depth to the 
question posed, ensuring to include both Eastern and Western views. 
Economic motivations are best supported by official statements or documents from 
the governments of China and Pakistan. Press statements, official communications, and 
other reports from officials in positions to make such statements are beneficial. Continued 
investment in Pakistan and CPEC could also indicate China’s motivation for CPEC, as 
Beijing would likely continue to invest if it were more concerned with economic growth 
and integration than by security motivations. The oversight of the NDRC props up the 
economics-motivated argument for BRI writ large. However, the vision paper put out by 
the commission does not address Pakistan or CPEC directly, but rather focuses on South 
Asia as a whole region.  
The argument for security motivations is bolstered by a historical view of China’s 
concern regarding Xinjiang and Pakistan. Evidence of Chinese pushing Pakistan toward 
additional counter-terror operations, or away from its intelligence service’s ties to the 
Pakistani Taliban, or any effort to quell anti-Chinese sentiment in Pakistan, especially 
among Uighurs would reinforce the idea that security is the motivating factor for China to 
pursue CPEC. A January 2018 “manifesto” was published on the front page of the People’s 
Daily, the official Chinese Communist Party newspaper, that “(t)he world needs China… 
That creates broad strategic room for our efforts to uphold peace and development and gain 
an advantage” (emphasis added).96 While similar statements have been used in the past, 
other statements within the front page piece included a “democratic” and “governance 
deficit,” along with the “drawbacks of capitalism-led political and economic systems are 
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emerging.”97  When considered with increasingly isolationist U.S. policies and a perceived 
loss of U.S. influence globally, these statements indicate that China is looking to take 
advantage of more than just an economic opportunity. 
Additionally, statements other official communications from officials in positions 
to make assertions regarding CPEC and motivations would also weigh heavily in favor of 
the security argument. Statements by Chinese officials referenced previously that these 
initiatives were the most important aspect of Chinese foreign policy lends credence to the 
security motivations argument.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis addresses the Chinese motivations for the BRI and CPEC initiatives, 
including dollar amounts of what has already been invested and where the BRI and CPEC 
will traverse, and how they relate to each other. A brief overview of the BRI and CPEC 
initiatives is provided. Chapter II covers CPEC, and includes what China and Pakistan have 
already built as part of the CPEC initiative, and how it fits into the broader BRI construct. 
Chapter II also looks at what problems China has faced with infrastructure development in 
the past. Chapter III examines the security argument, and Chapter IV covers the economic 
argument. The concluding chapter, Chapter V summarizes the previous arguments, along 
with my assessment as to the most likely explanation.  
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II. THE CHINA–PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR 
A key element of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the China–Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC), an infrastructure-building campaign in Pakistan, which began 
in 2015 with an estimated at US$46 billion dollars’ worth of investment, but increased to 
US$51.1 billion.98 It includes port facilities at Gwadar Port, roads, and pipelines.99 CPEC 
will span from Kashgar in the Chinese province of Xinjiang, to Gwardar port in the 
Pakistani province of Baluchistan.100 The Karakorum Highway (KKH) was completed in 
1979 and is slated to be widened and improved as part of CPEC.101 Several wind and coal-
fired power production facilities have been built to address widespread chronic power 
shortages in Pakistan.102 The plan covers projects to the year 2030, and is divided among 
short, medium, and long term projects. Short term projects are considered up to the year 
2020, medium term until 2025, and long term until 2030.103 CPEC is divided into five 
functional zones that encompass key functional “node” cities, which are: the foreign 
economic zone in Xinjiang, China; the trade logistics and business corridor and ecological 
reserve along the northern border; the central and eastern plain economic zone; the western 
logistics business zone; and the zone for southern coastal logistics business.104 Figure 1 
gives a visual overview of the BRI. 
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Figure 1. Map of the Belt and Road Overview105 
CPEC is not the first Chinese-Pakistani attempt to build infrastructure within 
Pakistan and between the two countries, but it is the newest and greatest. Pakistan was 
among the first countries, and the first Muslim country to recognize Communist China as 
the legitimate government of mainland China.106 Their relationship has been consistently 
characterized as “sweeter than honey,” “deeper than the deepest ocean,” and “all-weather 
friends.”107 The first and most important joint infrastructure-building project was the 
Karakorum Highway, a stretch of road passing through some of the highest points on earth, 
reaching heights of 15,397 ft between China and Pakistan that has become the central land 
artery between the two countries.108 Taking over 27 years to build, over 1,000 Chinese and 
                                                 
105 Source: Mercator Institute for China Studies, “Mapping the Belt and Road Initiative: this is where 
we stand,” June 7, 2018, https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/MERICS_Silk_Road_v8.jpg 
106 Small, The China Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics, 19. 
107 Ibid., 3. 
108 Ibid., xv, 99. 
21 
Pakistani workers died building the KKH, which has become a symbol of the solidity of 
relations between the two.109  The highway is functional, but carries only 7–8% of trade 
between China and Pakistan, so it’s function is mainly symbolic, as air and sea transport 
have overtaken this land route.110 The area which the KKH passes through is prone to 
landslides and flooding, and part of the KKH has been submerged underwater since 
2010.111 This lake, near Attabad, is 14 miles long and over 100 meters deep, and was 
formed after a landslide.112 Small boats transport goods across the lake to keep trade 
flowing, but such a method is not efficient.113  Although not originally planned as part of 
a greater network, the KKH has been integrated in to the greater CPEC plan.  
CPEC was not originally conceived as a portion of China’s BRI, as portions of 
CPEC predate China’s initiative, but it has been wrapped into the overall BRI construct. 
Since 2015, CPEC has been slated as the “flagship project” of BRI, mostly because the 
most infrastructure already exists out of all BRI projects.114 Consisting of roads, rail lines, 
pipelines, power production facilities, and a deep water port at Gwadar, this corridor will 
be a test case for the broader BRI plans.115 Since the 1960s China had envisioned Pakistani 
ports to revitalize what it saw as “an ‘ancient trade route…lost to modern times, not only 
for trade bur for strategic purposes as well.’”116 This history of project planning alleviated 
the requirement for additional feasibility studies prior to beginning construction.117 This 
test case may also be used to demonstrate China’s ability to deliver on promised projects, 
as well as its ability to complete projects in difficult operating environments to potential 
partner countries.  
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The highway systems will link numerous Pakistani cities, including Lahore, 
Peshawar, Karachi, and Gwadar.118 Rail lines will be built or expanded and link major 
cities as well as towns, eventually linking Karachi to Gwadar, and linking up to rail lines 
extending into Iran.119 Railways into China are also planned.120 Fiber optic cables will 
run for 820 kilometers and link communication networks north to south.121 Figures 2, 3, 
and 4 depict these systems. Multiple power projects are also part of the corridor, including 
hydroelectric plants, coal power plants, and wind power fields. Of the 15 projects currently 
part of the corridor, six are operational or partly operational and mostly consist of coal-fire 
and wind power generating plants, with four expecting to reach commercial operation dates 
by 2019.122 Two hydro power stations are expected to reach commercial operation dates 
in 2020 or 2021.123 A total of nine Special Economic Zones have also been proposed as 
part of CPEC.124 These zones vary in the type of industry, but cover agriculture; textiles; 
steel; iron ore; and other processing and manufacturing industries.125 The Long Term Plan 
for CPEC also covers a somewhat ambiguous plan for: agricultural and livestock areas; 
calling for cooperation regarding agricultural production, processing, disease prevention; 
irrigation; and land development.126  
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Figure 2. CPEC Highway Network Map127 
                                                 




Figure 3. CPEC Railway Network Map128 
                                                 




Figure 4. CPEC Fiber Optic Cable Network Map129 
China is increasingly focused on what it sees as the Malacca Dilemma, or the 
perceived critical vulnerability the Strait of Malacca poses if the Strait were to be closed 
or otherwise threatened. China is the second largest economy in the world, at US$14 
trillion, behind the United States at UD$20.4 trillion in the first half of 2018.130 China’s 
economy is still heavily focused on manufacturing, and thus requires continual access to 
resources, including oil. China became the world’s largest energy consumer in 2010, and 
by 2014 China consumed one fifth of the world’s energy consumption.131 With a 
forecasted growth in 2018 of 6.6 percent, slightly below the previous two years, China’s 
economy continues to expand and thus requires increasingly more resources.132 British 
Petroleum forecasts that by 2035, global energy demands will increase from current levels 
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by 41 percent, with China and India constituting over half the demand in global energy.133 
More than 80 percent of China’s oil imports, originating in the Middle East and Africa, 
flow through the Strait of Malacca, one of the busiest waterways in the world.134 The 
International Energy Agency projects that China will need to import four fifths of its oil 
demands by 2030.135 Most of China’s natural gas flows in pipelines from Turkmenistan, 
via pipelines in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, totaling about 46 percent of imports.136 A 
China-Burma pipeline was completed in 2015, but negotiations continue on transit fees and 
thus it is not fully operational.137 This pipeline is supplied by crude oil from Middle East 
and African countries, and bypasses the Malacca Strait.138 It is estimated that it is four to 
five times more costly to send oil over land from Gwadar to Xinjiang than by sea to 
Shanghai, highlighting China’s emphasis on solving this Malacca Dilemma.139  Figure 5 
depicts the transit routes China utilizes for energy imports, and Figure 6 depicts China’s 
forecasted energy demands into 2035. 
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Figure 5. Transit Routes for Chinese Energy Imports140 
                                                 
140 Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
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28 
 
Figure 6. Energy Demands for the U.S., European Union, and China  in 
Million Tons Equivalent of Oil141 
As previously mentioned, China’s economy is heavily dependent on manufacturing 
and its market is export-oriented. Over the last several years China has desired and is 
attempting to move to a more service-based economy in an attempt to escape the middle 
income trap and promote long term economic growth. This move to a more service-based 
economy is based less on Chinese economic savant, and more on reactions to the market. 
As China’s economy has grown, wages within China have increased, thus costing China 
its manufacturing comparative advantages.142 Manufacturing-based economies are more 
strongly tied to the strength of other economies.143 Service-based economies are less so. 
China has begun initiatives such as the “Made in China 2025,” a manufacturing industry 
upgrade push to restructure China’s manufacturing industry, make it more innovation-
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driven, and emphasize quality over quantity.144 The OBOR initiative is expected to play a 
prominent role in the exporting of higher-end Chinese goods.145  
China’s energy generation is heavily dependent on coal, which made up 
approximately 70 percent of its energy needs from 1980 to 2014, consuming as much coal 
as the rest of the countries in the world combined.146 Coal is nearly three times cheaper 
for energy generation in China than other methods, but recent events endogenous and 
exogenous to China may shift that.147 Chinese environmentalists and citizens have been 
pushing for more sustainable and environmentally sustainable energy sources, and China 
signing on the Paris Climate Accord may signal an end to cheap coal.148 China has set a 
goal for natural gas consumption at ten percent, up from its current six percent, and in 2015 
invested nearly UD$90 billion in renewable energy, the highest in the world.149 As China 
transforms into a more service-based economy, the shift from coal and fossil fuels to 
renewable sources may become more articulated. This is due partly because service-based 
economies are less energy intensive than manufacturing and export-based economies.150 
Figure 7 depicts China’s energy trends and breakdown since 1990. 
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Figure 7. Chinese Energy Consumption and Energy Breakdown151 
The port at Gwadar has become a central focus of CPEC. This port allows China to 
bypass the Malacca Strait by importing and transferring goods, materials, and energy into 
China through the CPEC infrastructure. Gwadar was purchased from Oman in 1958, and 
was nothing more than a quiet fishing village.152 While Gwadar holds a strategic location 
on the Arabian Sea, it lies in the restive, resource-rich but underdeveloped province of 
Baluchistan, prone to ethnic violence and insurgency.153 Gwadar Port opened in 2007, 
with the Port of Singapore Authority assuming control of port operations until the lease 
was transferred to China Overseas Port Holding Company – Pakistan for 40 years in 
2013.154 A second phase of the port construction was intended to follow, comprising of oil 
terminals, cargo terminals, a roll-on/roll-off terminal, and a grain terminal in order to 
transform it into a commercial hub.155 China was also to build an oil refinery at Gwadar 
as well, yet very little of this second phase has been built.156 In 2017, Gwadar Port had 
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only nine vessels call, handling approximately 3,600 metric tons.157 Upon completion of 
additional berths, it is projected that Gwadar will handle up to a million metric tons.158 
However, the expansion projects are still being reviewed, and thus have not been funded 
or construction begun.159  
The current small capacity is not Gwadar’s only problem. Like the rest of Pakistan, 
Gwadar suffers from electricity shortages, and even with energy imports from Iran, outages 
can last up to ten hours each day.160 CPEC energy projects aim to eliminate these extreme 
shortages, but current infrastructure is not enough. Gwadar also experiences extreme 
potable water shortages, and while two desalinization plants exist in Gwadar Port local 
officials claim that the plants only support and benefit the port and not the city’s 
population.161 Much of the local population relies on subsistence fishing in Gwadar Port, 
and in recent years the Pakistani government has prevented them from fishing due to 
security concerns.162 Fears and feelings of alienation are not new in Baluchistan. The 
province has desired independence dating back to the partition of Pakistan from India in 
1947.163 CPEC has brought foreign and non-Baluch workers into the province, further 
stoking fears within the Baluch community that they will become a minority in their own 
province.164 Baluchi in Gwadar also claim exclusion from job opportunities in port and 
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construction projects.165 The Frontier Works Organization, run by the Pakistani military 
control most construction projects in Baluchistan as well as other areas of Pakistan, have 
been criticized for using labor from Punjab rather than from the local Baluch population.166 
Baluchi disenfranchisement only furthers this sense of alienation at best, and at worst 
appears to be a concerted effort by the government to displace and further disenfranchise 
Baluchi.167 A tongue-in-cheek joke reflects these fears and ethnic tensions—that CPEC 
actually stands for “the China Punjab Economic Corridor.”168 Over the 40 year lease China 
Overseas Port Holding Company – Pakistan holds, China will received 91 percent of the 
profit from the port’s operations, while the Gwadar Port Authority will receive the other 
nine percent.169 The provincial government in Baluchistan will receive nothing, raising 
questions as to what exactly CPEC offers Baluchistan.170 This uneven distribution of profit 
only further fuels the anxiety felt by the Baluch. 
Baluchistan suffers from endemic ethnic conflict and violence against both 
Pakistani security forces and Chinese workers, becoming one of the most dangerous places 
to be an overseas Chinese worker.171 Kidnappings and killings occur regularly, and date 
back to as early as 2004. The Pakistani security forces are not without blame. Under the 
Musharraf regime, which ended in 2008, they carried out kidnappings, torture, and killings 
of hundreds, possibly thousands of Baluch nationalists or sympathizers, in an attempt to 
suppress dissent.172 Such tactics continue under the current government.173 Not only do 
such tactics reinforce fears of marginalization, but these tactics provide recruiting material 
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for terror groups or violent Baluch nationalists.174 The civilian population is caught in the 
metaphoric and literal crossfire—if they cooperate with Pakistani security forces, militants 
threaten them; if they cooperate with militants, they are targeted by security forces.175 An 
uncertain security environment leads to an uncertain economic one, as instability does not 
promote foreign investment because the risks are too great.  
Ethnic conflict is particularly dangerous, as it often results in violence and perpetual 
instability of a region or state. Violence and state instability often dissuade foreign 
investment, as investors seek stability and the ability to predict future performance of their 
investments. This is especially true of physical infrastructure. Ethnic tensions in 
Baluchistan, a critical portion of CPEC, could threaten to extend construction timelines 
and operability of CPEC thus further delaying economic and development benefits to 
Pakistan and China. Like Pakistan, China continues to combat low-grade insurgency within 
its borders from the Uighur minority in Xinjiang, where CPEC physically connects 
Pakistan and China, which is exacerbated by economic inequality between the Han and 
Uighurs; the Han tend to be better educated and more economically prosperous than 
Uighurs.176 Uighurs have also accused the Chinese central government of religious and 
ethnic discrimination, and fear that any influx of money into Xinjiang will 
disproportionally benefit ethnic Han. Uighurs are also Muslim in a nation that is hostile to 
organized religion. Both the Baluchi in Pakistan and the Uighurs in Xinjiang are ethnically 
different than the majority in power, have a different cultural identity, and fear that any 
economic or social development will unequally favor the majority ethnic group, even when 
the infrastructure transverses their territory. Neither Pakistan or China have made 
significant efforts to assuage these concerns, thus continued conflict is likely.   
The potential benefits to China are also numerous. A successful implementation 
could be advertised to partner or potential partner countries of the viability of the broader 
BRI construct, as well as demonstrate China as an alternative partner option to Western 
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countries, and the United States specifically. China will secure its much desired access to 
the Arabian Sea and solving its Malacca Dilemma through Gwadar Port. Gwadar Port 
could theoretically be used as a naval base for logistics and resupply for the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy, though that possibility has been downplayed.177 By linking the 
troubled region of Xinjiang with Pakistan, should CPEC be economically prosperous, it 
could lead to prosperity in Xinjiang and thus reducing violence and resentment in the 
region. China has not been coy regarding the benefit of the BRI, to include CPEC, to China, 
stating in a 2018 “manifesto” on the front page of the People’s Daily that “[t]he world 
needs China… That creates broad strategic room for our efforts to uphold peace and 
development and gain an advantage” (emphasis added).178  How much of China’s 
promised funding will come through is a legitimate question. A RAND Corporation study 
that detailed Chinese-pledged assistance to Pakistan over a decade between 2001 and 2011 
at a value of U.S. $66 billion, however only six percent of the investment actually came to 
fruition.179  
Political strife, corruption, and violence within Pakistan has hurt its economy. 
Pakistan’s reputation, deservedly or not as a hotbed of terrorism has also affected foreign 
direct investment. Pakistan ranks 116 out of 176 of corrupt countries, and has a score of 32 
out of 100, meaning it is highly corrupt. To put it in perspective, Pakistan is trailed by 
countries like Sierra Leone, Kazakhstan, Iran, and Russia.180 Alexander Cooley notes that 
Chinese officials expect to lose up to 80% of their investment in the China–Pakistan 
Economic Corridor to Pakistani corruption.181 If the Pakistani government can gain control 
over the violence in Baluchistan and reduce government corruption, CPEC could provide 
important benefits to Pakistan. With the CPEC infrastructure, Pakistan forecasts over six 
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percent growth rates in its GDP.182 Free trade zones, updated infrastructure, and a safe 
physical space could attract additional foreign direct investment into the Pakistani economy 
and contributing to its growth. Pakistan is an export-oriented market, with half of 
Pakistan’s economy is textile manufacturing.183 This lack of diversification in 
manufacturing coupled with its export-oriented economy has made the Pakistani economy 
susceptible to shifts in global demand for its products.184 Additional power generating 
plants could significantly reduce or end the chronic electricity shortage in Pakistan, which 
would also contribute to growing the economy, human development, and overall quality of 
life for the population. While power plants of varying types have been constructed and 
come on line, they are not yet enough to meet current or future demand. A stronger 
economy would allow for the enfranchisement of minority populations, and thus 
potentially undermining extremist recruiting. The Pakistani economy is heavily reliant on 
bailouts from the International Monetary Fund, with the most recent in 2013, and 
potentially another in 2018.185 A large portion of Pakistan’s government spending goes to 
the military, with the 2018–19 budget increased to RS1.1 trillion, or over US$8.8 billion, 
with an overall Gross Domestic Product of US$304 billion.186 The largest percentage of 
Pakistan’s GDP goes to debt servicing, accounting for nearly 30 percent of GDP at nearly 
US$ 92 billion.187 This leaves little money to put toward development and services within 
Pakistan. 
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China hopes this key portion of its Belt and Road Initiative will solve a long term 
fear of strategic encirclement and long term requirement for energy. However, significant 
problems face the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, especially in Gwadar that must be 
overcome if China is to succeed in its quest for energy security. The tumultuous security 
situation in Pakistan threatens both CPEC as well as inhibits foreign direct investment, thus 
contributing to a weak economy and continued internal strife. However, unless there is a 
shift in the way CPEC projects are implemented and who they benefit, certain projects—
especially in Baluchistan—could only fan the flames of tension and conflict.188 
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF SECURITY AS THE DRIVER 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative is touted as an economic enterprise with benefits 
for all parties involved. China contests the framing of BRI as a geostrategic tool but claims 
that all participants in the initiative are equal partners, and that the initiative seeks to 
achieve win-win outcomes, according to the spokesman for the 13th People’s Congress, 
Zhang Yesui.189 Yet an examination of where China is investing suggests that economics 
is not the underlying motivation for BRI. If this initiative was purely economic in nature, 
China would invest in countries with lower risks of default and credit ratings that would 
allow the countries to borrow from other institutions. However, China has invested in 
countries with the highest risks of default, which suffer from significant economic and 
governance issues. Of the top ten recipients of foreign investment, six are rated by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as having the highest 
risk for default (see Figure 8).190 Of these six countries, five have signed on to BRI 
projects, and one is a prospective BRI partner. If China is making investments for an 
initiative that are economically risky, are economic drivers really behind this initiative? If 
the driver was economic, China would seek stable investments with lower risks of default 
than what they have done. Another potential explanation is that China is using BRI, its 
accompanying infrastructure, and loans in order to spread Chinese influence globally. 
China’s focus on internal security spending and investments into unstable countries and 
regions indicates that the main driver is security focused, not economic. 
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Figure 8. Chinese Lending to High Default-Risk Countries191 
China has not been reserved regarding the benefit of the BRI to China, stating in a 
2018 “manifesto” on the front page of the People’s Daily that “[t]he world needs China… 
That creates broad strategic room for our efforts to uphold peace and development and gain 
an advantage” (emphasis added).192 While Chinese officials have used this type of 
language previously, in the context of BRI and large sums of investment already occurring, 
the statements gain new traction. Chinese scholars have confided that a purpose of the BRI 
was to internationalize the Renminbi, because China sought to challenge the U.S. dollar by 
making it the currency of initiative transactions.193 This drive to gain the advantage is 
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causing concern among neighboring states, and those that bought into the BRI that China 
is embarking on a neo-colonial push across the globe.194  
A. CPEC, GWADAR, AND CHINA’S OIL DEMAND 
The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, with its crown jewel in Gwadar Port is not 
without difficulties. While Gwadar holds a strategic location on the Arabian Sea, it lies in 
the resource-rich but underdeveloped province of Baluchistan, prone to ethnic violence and 
insurgency as mentioned in the previous chapter.195 Opened in 2007, with the China 
Overseas Port Holding Company – Pakistan  gained control for 40 years in 2013.196 A 
second phase of the port construction was intended to follow, consisting of oil terminals, 
cargo terminals, a roll-on/roll-off terminal, and a grain terminal in order to transform it into 
a commercial hub.197 China was also to build an oil refinery at Gwadar as well, yet very 
little of this second phase has been built.198 However, the additional projects are plagued 
with delays and setbacks.199 In 2017, Gwadar Port had only nine vessels call, handling 
approximately 3,600 metric tons.200  
Recently, Chinese media has begun to question Gwadar’s economic benefits to 
China, mainly due to the port being unable to handle China’s oil import demands and the 
higher cost of transporting oil via pipeline.201 It is estimated that it is four to five times 
more costly to send oil over land from Gwadar to Xinjiang than by sea to Shanghai.202 
Economically it makes little sense to choose a more costly route to import oil, but viewing 
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it through a security lens it makes sense to ensure access to vital resources. China has built 
a network of pipelines along with the plan to create oil transporting infrastructure in 
Gwadar because of a perceived security vulnerability the Chinese call the Malacca 
Dilemma. This is a term used to describe what China views as a strategic vulnerability to 
its access to energy and markets. Nearly 80 percent of oil imports and 11 percent of natural 
gas imports to China passes through the Strait of Malacca, and China fears an interruption 
of the flow of that traffic, either from at-sea crimes or from the United States, would have 
significant impact on the Chinese economy and its ability to project power.203 While the 
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor might be economic for Pakistan, it is certainly 
security-focused for China. 
China’s demand for oil has changed its foreign policy goals in the last fifteen years, 
with an emphasis on foreign oil as China became a net importer of oil in 1993, when its 
consumption surpassed its production.204 The International Energy Agency estimates that 
by 2030, four-fifths of China’s oil will need to be imported.205 This dependence on foreign 
oil, and the requirement that it traverse large swaths of the globe far from the mainland and 
often perceived to be controlled by the United States—the Malacca Dilemma—caused 
Chinese leaders to pause and debate what energy security means to China and how to 
achieve it.206 As is the goal of many nations including the United States, China seeks to 
achieve and maintain energy security, and this goal has become an important aspect of 
Chinese foreign policy.207 
Gwadar also has the potential to act as a naval base for either Pakistani or Chinese 
naval forces, or both. Gwadar was offered to the United States to develop as a base in the 
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1970s, but the United States passed on the offer.208 Use as a naval base by the Pakistani 
navy concerns Balochis in the region, as they see it as an attempt by the Pakistani military 
to strengthen its presence in the troubled region.209 In the past, Chinese officials have 
denied the desire by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to use it as a base, but 
over the decade, the PLAN has deployed its forces further from the mainland, and China 
has increasingly deployed its forces in support of activities such as United Nations peace 
keeping operations.210 In its current configuration, it is unlikely that the PLAN could use 
it as a place to stage naval forces, though it could be used as a port of call to resupply food 
and fuel stores. 
B. BRI: A NEO-COLONIAL PUSH? 
Some of China’s investments abroad, both for projects that predate the 
announcement of BRI and BRI projects that followed are loans that are repaid in resources 
rather than cash. Venezuela struck a deal with China to repay loans for a items such as high 
speed rail system, gold mines, and refineries in oil when oil ran nearly US$100 per 
barrel.211 When the price of oil dropped by two-thirds in 2016, Venezuela had to export 
two barrels for every one originally agreed upon.212 China has loaned Venezuela US$65 
billion dollars over the last decade, which according to World Bank data is greater than 
any sum that the World Bank has loaned any country since 1945, with the sole exception 
of India.213  A similar deal was struck with Ghana, where the Chinese firm increased the 
number of barrels per day required to repay, causing the Ghanaian government to cancel 
the half the US$3 billion loan.214 Prior to the announcement of BRI, in 2007 Chinese firms 
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agreed to a nearly US$9 billion deal with the Democratic Republic of the Congo for copper 
and cobalt mines, with repayment to be made in those resources.215 The deal was plagued 
with difficulties and delays, including the inability to secure electricity from the Congo for 
the mine’s operation, and the total copper reserves in the mine was adjusted to 35 percent 
below the original estimate.216 The market price for copper dropped nearly 20 percent, and 
the overall deal may end in a large net loss for the Chinese firms.217 These few examples 
show that Chinese firms have a record of misjudging potential markets. Critics of the deal 
in the Congo argued that China is taking advantage of a poor and developing country in 
their quest for access to resources and markets.218  
Aside from resources, China also secured a 99 year lease to the Sri Lankan port of 
Hambantota, after Sri Lanka was unable to repay a joint developed port facility with China, 
at the cost of around US$1.1 billion.219 The government of Sri Lanka still owes state-
owned Chinese firms approximately US$8 billion.220 As in the case in the Sri Lankan port 
of Hambantota, states may fear a required turnover of control of the infrastructure to 
Chinese firms as part of the loan terms if they fail to repay.221 As BRI projects continue, 
if such measures become more common, BRI states may rethink loan or project terms, or 
demand less stringent Chinese terms. Alternatively, it could also set a dangerous 
precedence where states agree to sign over territory a form of debt settlement.222 
Opposition could potentially set precedence for other BRI states to cancel, decline, or 
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sideline projects that are suboptimal for the host country.223 While such cancellations or 
stalling of projects on a large scale across multiple BRI countries would probably not derail 
BRI completely, it could hinder the initiative’s overall potential growth.   
C. MORE THAN ACCESS TO RESOURCES 
Access to resources is not the only factor in the argument that security is China’s 
main driver for BRI. Internal security is arguably more important to China than external 
security. Annually, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) spends more on internal 
security than any other area. In 2017, Chinese domestic security spending totaled US$197 
billion.224 While the Tibetan Autonomous Region receives the largest amount of domestic 
security spending, Xinjiang is second and saw a 92.8 percent increase in domestic security 
spending between 2017 and 2018.225 When adjusted for Purchasing Power parity, both 
Chinese domestic spending for Xinjiang and the Tibetan Autonomous Region exceed U.S. 
domestic security spending by 32 and 37 percent, respectively.226 This focuses on internal 
security was also featured in Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th Party Congress. China views 
the southwest frontier provinces such as Xinjiang as its “soft underbelly,” and has felt an 
unstable grip on the region since it was fully incorporated into the Chinese empire during 
the Qing Dynasty.227 The underdevelopment, ethnic and religious conflict, and remote 
locations of the five southwest frontier provinces is a partial motivation for BRI, but the 
desire to increase the standard of living in those provinces isn’t the result of altruistic 
motives, rather it is based on a quest for security and to placate the ethnic minority 
populations living there.228  
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Domestic issues are not the only concern for CCP leaders regarding Xinjiang, as 
the cross border issue of Pakistani militant support to Uighur separatists is also a concern. 
Populated by a Muslim Turkic people the Uighurs are ethnically, religiously, linguistically, 
and culturally different than the majority Han Chinese. Officially, the CCP is atheist, and 
has sometimes taken a hostile stance toward religion. Separatist independence movements 
in Xinjiang have existed since at least the 1990s, of which the East Turkistan Islamic 
Movement is a part of.229 The region declared independence in 1933 and 1944, but were 
subsequently reabsorbed by the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China, 
respectively.230  
China continues to combat a low-grade insurgency within its borders from the 
Uighur minority in Xinjiang, and battle Sinophobia throughout the region as its influence 
and power grows. Unrest in Xinjiang is linked Pakistan,231 which played a critical role in 
the shift of Uighur sentiment from mostly secular to Islamist in nature.232 Many of the 
young Uighur men that traveled to Pakistan to seek religious education ended up being 
funneled into madrassas that were hotbeds for extremist recruitment and radicalization.233 
Coupled with a desire to establish an independent country, China feared an outbreak of 
extremist violence. Beginning in 2008, that is exactly what occurred, and the violence hit 
an apex in 2009 and continues. During 2009, violence broke out in Xinjiang, where Uighurs 
and ethnic Han Chinese clashed, and although the exact number of causalities is unknown 
due to Chinese strict control of the media and information, the official Chinese death toll 
is 184.234 In 2012, Uighurs and Han again clashed, killing at least 12 people as men armed 
with knives attacked people in Kashgar, near the Pakistani border and where the China–
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Pakistan Economic Corridor will physically connect the two countries.235  Chinese 
authorities claim that the men were Muslims with links to Pakistani terrorists.236  
In 2012, a terror attack targeting the Forbidden City was perpetuated by Uighurs 
who came from an area close to the Xinjiang-Pakistan border, and resulted in two deaths 
and 38 wounded and embarrassed Chinese security services.237 These are just a few 
examples of violence in Xinjiang, and there are many others. Pakistan has been a source of 
training and support for militant Uighurs in Xinjiang.238 However, due to the China-
Pakistan relationship, Chinese officials typically refrain from publicly implicating Pakistan 
directly. Such unrest in a province far away from the capital with a history of being difficult 
to control further fuels the CCP’s unease with the region. By physically connecting 
Pakistan and Xinjiang, CPEC presents additional security concerns for the CCP, as these 
physical connections could further facilitate Uighur extremist movement.  
D. BRI AS A FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE 
While the commission responsible for coordinating BRI projects is the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Chinese Foreign Minister in 2015 
stated that the BRI was the key focus of Chinese foreign policy.239 Based on its size, 
history, civilization, and population, Chinese leaders believe that China belongs with the 
“‘great power’ club” and seeks to reestablish China’s place as a great power once more, as 
two scholars at China’s Academy of Social Sciences argue.240 China has sought a peaceful 
rise, and believes that it can only accomplish this if it belongs to the international system 
and mostly adheres to international norms.241 In order to achieve a peaceful rise China 
needs regional and global actors to be receptive of it, and by participating in the 
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international order, China recognizes that participation is the way to shape the future of the 
international order.242 BRI is a vehicle for growth and acclimation to its rise, as well as 
acceptance of any changes to the world order it may propose. China’s official narrative has 
been that a rising China is an opportunity, not a threat.243 BRI, advertised as an economic 
path beneficial to all would give support to the official narrative. However, recently 
Chinese statements have been indicating signs that China is beginning to steer away from 
a more subdued foreign policy to a more active and prominent.244 This raises concerns that 
China, through economic power and means is seeking to advance its foreign policy 
objectives and enhance its global position.245  
Special courts in China have been established to litigate BRI cases, which have 
been increasing in recent months.246  The court consists of three international commercial 
courts, one handling the overland route, one handling the maritime route, and a supreme 
court in Beijing.247 The courts were reportedly set up because many of the countries 
involved in BRI are not well adjusted to other forms of arbitration, which mainly uses 
western law.248 However, it is unclear if BRI participating states are actually less adapted 
to international arbitration, or if it is another attempt by Beijing to utilize arbitration forms 
that it controls or otherwise favors.249 Since some disputes are cross-border, it is unclear 
how Chinese legal authority and other state’s legal authority will intersect to arbitrate such 
cases.250  
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If China wishes to join the world’s great powers, it will need the freedom of 
maneuver and the ability to prevent other powerful states from exerting their will on it. 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative is in part China’s attempt at gaining that maneuvering 
space and the international clout to go with it. If China’s goals with BRI were purely 
economic, the investments made by Chinese firms would be less risky than what has been 
demonstrated. As previously mentioned, between 2013 and 2015, China invested in six 
countries that have the highest risk of default according to the OECD, contrasted with just 
two that the World Bank invested in for a time period twice as long.251 Even before BRI 
was announced, China saw firsthand the effects of poor investment in unstable countries 
with governance issues. Chinese companies will likely suffer net losses in areas such as 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, and Venezuela. In the example of the 
Congo, this deal predated the Belt and Road Initiative by six years.  
China brings large sums of money to poor and developing nations which suffer 
from underdevelopment, corruption, and other governance issues but which are rich in 
resources China wants or needs. For these countries, it makes economic sense to accept 
Chinese funds. Yet for China, these countries are often unable to pay the terms of the loan. 
As China increases its investment abroad and in countries that are at high risk of loan 
default, it could create a series of large underperforming loans that the Chinese economy 
must deal with, and that the central government must deal with political and internal social 
backlash.  
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IV. ECONOMICS AS THE DRIVER FOR CHINA’S BELT AND 
ROAD INITIATIVE 
A second explanation of China’s motivation for the Belt and Road Initiative is 
economic. China frames the BRI as a way to further economically integrate the region and 
produce win-win outcomes for every party involved. The BRI is also designed to ensure 
Chinese access to resources and markets, to continue long-term economic growth. While 
economics is undoubtedly important to Chinese decision makers, the economic argument 
is unable to rationalize risky investments in countries with the highest risks of default and 
lower than investible grade credit ratings. Beijing created an BRI oversight office, which 
was placed under control of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
China’s premier economic planning commission.252 The NDRC’s focus is on economic 
cooperation and global economic integration, with five goals listed as part of the vision for 
the Belt and Road Initiative, including policy coordination, unimpeded trade, and facilities 
connectivity.253 China is using the BRI initiative to create regional economic integration 
to assert Chinese dominance regionally.254 Within China the southwestern provinces 
continually lag behind the eastern ones with per capita incomes in these areas have 
consistently fallen behind for the last six decades, which Beijing thinks is the primary factor 
for instability.255 Lu Shuling, the former Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, postulates that 
economic development provided by BRI and CPEC in China’s southwest frontiers, as well 
as regionally will help combat the primary driver of insurgency and separatism in Pakistan 
and Xinjiang, which he believes is poverty.256 However poverty is not the sole driver of 
violence and separatism in Xinjiang. Uighurs experience ethnic, religious, and economic 
discrimination within China’s borders, which the economic argument ignores. 
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China is the second largest economy in the world, at US$14 trillion, behind the 
United States at UD$20.4 trillion in the first half of 2018.257 China’s economy is still 
heavily focused on manufacturing, and thus requires continual access to resources, 
including oil. China became the world’s largest energy consumer in 2010, and by 2014 
China consumed one fifth of the world’s energy consumption.258 With a forecasted growth 
in 2018 of 6.6 percent, slightly below the previous two years, China’s economy continues 
to expand and thus requires increasingly more resources.259 British Petroleum forecasts 
that by 2035 global energy demands will increase from current levels by 41 percent, with 
China and India constituting over half the demand in global energy.260 As China’s 
economy grows and moves from a manufacturing based economy to more service based, 
leaders in Beijing need to ensure continued economic growth. The BRI and CPEC are the 
answer. Additional and alternate routes for resources and goods to and from China as well 
as additional markets for Chinese goods are important elements of continued Chinese 
economic growth. CPEC offers both. 
Over the last several years China has desired and is attempting to move away from 
an export-oriented manufacturing economy to a more service-based economy in an attempt 
to escape the middle income trap and promote long term economic growth. This move to 
a more service-based economy is based less on Chinese economic savant, and more on 
reactions to the market. As China’s economy has grown, wages within China have 
increased, thus costing China its manufacturing comparative advantages.261 
Manufacturing-based economies are more strongly tied to the strength of other 
economies.262 Service-based economies are less so. China has begun initiatives such as 
the “Made in China 2025,” a manufacturing industry upgrade push to restructure China’s 
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manufacturing industry, make it more innovation-driven, and emphasize quality over 
quantity.263 The BRI initiative is expected to play a prominent role in the exporting of 
higher-end Chinese goods.264  
Economic growth is key to the Chinese Communist Party’s grip on power, internal 
stability, and external strength. The BRI is how the Party will seek to escape the middle 
income trap, maintain long-term economic growth, and enhance internal stability. Under 
the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, China’s economy grew rapidly, however economic 
development was lopsided, favoring the coastal areas and leaving the interior poor. The 
BRI is China’s most recent push to further develop the historically poorer areas of 
China.265 Pakistan likewise suffers from economic stagnation, electricity shortages, and 
other drains on its economy. As part of the larger BRI construct, CPEC offers opportunities 
for economic growth and addresses energy shortages. 
A. BRI AS THE NEW “GOING OUT” POLICY? 
Aside from the desire to promote economic growth internally, economic 
motivations extend outside China’s borders. As China’s economy has grown, wages within 
China have increased, thus costing China its manufacturing comparative advantages.266 
Stimulus packages during the global recession of 2008 has created excess capacity within 
China’s economy that it needs to offload, or risk economic crisis.267 When the global 
financial crisis of 2008 hit, the Chinese government injected huge sums of money into the 
its economy mainly through loans for construction and infrastructure projects within China. 
This saved the Chinese economy from some of the worst effects of the Global Financial 
Crisis, but had the unintended and persistent consequence of causing over-capacity in its 
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manufacturing sector in areas like steel and cement.268 During a 2014 statement to the 
China-ASEAN Summit, Premier Li Keqiang noted that China possessed large capacities 
in equipment and infrastructure-based production, and encouraged Chinese producers of 
steel, cement, iron, and pleat glass to shift production to ASEAN countries to create 
“mutual benefits.”269 
The BRI is the newest form of China’s “going out” policy of the early 21st century, 
where Chinese leaders emphasized Chinese companies to investment abroad. Instead of 
exporting natural resources from abroad and importing low-end goods, China seeks to 
move up the value chain to creating high-end manufactured goods and be at the center of 
regional production change and innovation, and to become the standard setter for 
technology and innovation.270 Peter Cai of the Lowy Institute notes that the BRI aims to 
address three key issues facing China’s economy: better integration with regional 
economies to encourage regional development beneficial to China; exporting Chinese 
standards while simultaneously upgrading China’s industry; and addressing China’s 
pressing issue with excess capacity.271  
Some experts argue that although the BRI is massive in scale, it is still not enough 
to address China’s excess capacity problem.272 Many countries have industries that are 
directly competing with Chinese companies in the infrastructure and construction sectors 
and thus may not be welcoming to Chinese firms setting up shop within their borders.273 
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Economics aside, it there is also the question of whether politically these countries want to 
absorb China’s unwanted surplus.274 
Analyzing Belt and Road projects is more difficult because there is no clear, agreed 
upon definition of what a BRI project is.275 With 70 countries claiming participation in 
BRI, there are projects in nonparticipant countries with similar characteristics to BRI 
projects.276 China had infrastructure and other projects abroad prior to the announcement 
of the initiative that are being counted as BRI projects.277 Jonathan Hillman of the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies described it as “more a loose brand than a program 
with strict criteria.”278 Transparency is a main critique of BRI projects from the outside.  
While the BRI has been placed under the NDRC, a key component of Chinese 
internal politics is the Leading Small Groups. The chair of the BRI Leading Small Group 
is Zhang Gaoli, who is also a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party.279 Beneath him are four deputy chairs, who have equal shared 
responsibility.280 These deputy chairs are: Wang Huning, the Head of Policy Planning for 
the Chinese Communist Party and President Xi’s chief advisor; Wang Yang, the Deputy 
Premier responsible for Trade and Economic Issues; Yang Jiechi, the Foreign Affairs State 
Councilor; and Yang Jing, the State Council Secretary General.281 There are five different 
people from five different areas of government that have equal power in this Leading Small 
group, with equal power to override the other on which projects to choose for BRI and 
why.282 Economic agencies have different criteria for what projects they advocate for than 
foreign affairs agencies. Further muddying the proverbial waters is that within the Chinese 
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Communist Party, a hierarchical structure exists where ministers may be outranked by 
party rank by a CEO of a state owned enterprise.283 The presence of economic and foreign 
policy officials on the Leading Small Group for the BRI supports statements made by Xi 
Jinping and other Party officials that the BRI is China’s foreign policy and economic focus.  
B. MADE IN CHINA 2025 
China is also looking to create markets for higher-priced Chinese goods that the 
West is unlikely to buy.284 The Chinese also seek to be the standard bearers for BRI 
countries in areas like science and technology, as some Chinese sources think that “only 
companies that make standards can be considered world-class companies.”285 China’s 
“Made in China 2025” is a manufacturing industry upgrade push to restructure China’s 
manufacturing industry, make it more innovation-driven, push smart technology, and 
emphasize quality over quantity, but also to export such technology abroad.286 The 
foremost example of this is high speed rail technology that China has been seeking to 
export to places like Indonesia and Thailand.287 By establishing Chinese firms in these 
sectors and establishing Chinese technology and standards, China seeks to supplant 
western countries in these fields in Asia and abroad. However, this initiative has drawn the 
ire of China’s large trading partners, to include the United States and the European 
Union.288 
This ire is a result of China’s state support of certain “strategic emerging 
industries,” to include: biotechnology; information technology; artificial intelligence; 
electric and new energy vehicles; advanced materials; and energy distribution and 
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storage.289 This support includes access to capital, constraining foreign competitors 
through competition policy and under the broad guise of “national security,” and aggressive 
protection of Chinese intellectual property.290 Constraining competition from firms that 
are not Chinese and a declining business atmosphere is the most concerning for U.S. and 
European firms.291 This concern not only stems from a competition and profit standpoint, 
but also the concern that a lack of foreign competition could damage supply chains, 
research and development in these fields, leading to decreased productivity much like what 
happened in the Chinese steel and aluminum sector.292 
Recently, the Chinese central government directed state media outlets to reduce the 
mentions of “Made in China 2025.”293  The Ministry of Commerce has also reduced 
mentions of the push on their website, and at a June 2018 press conference regarding smart 
technology, the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology did not mention “Made in China 2025.”294 Chinese ministers 
have avoided using the “Made in China 2025” terminology, and instead have described 
actions as following guidelines outlined in the 18th Party Congress.295 This reduction of 
specific mentions of “Made in China 2025” by official media outlets and central 
government ministries appears to be an attempt to downplay the initiative and placate 
European trading partners and specifically the United States, as both China and the United 
States trade tariff-for-tariff blows on each other’s industries.296 
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C. BRI AS A TRADE FACILITATOR 
While BRI projects themselves are hard to analyze due to the lack of transparency 
and the long-term nature of large infrastructure projects, changes in trade and investment 
can be used to look at China’s BRI progress. The trade of merchandise goods between 
China and the BRI countries increased 19.4 percent between the fourth quarter of 2017 and 
the first quarter of 2018, for a total of $U.S. 287.3 billion.297 Exports and imports in this 
same period rose by 16.5 percent and 23.2 percent, respectively.298 The BRI countries 
accounted for nearly a third (29.1 percent) of China’s total exports in the first quarter of 
2018, an increase from 27.9 percent in the previous quarter.299 These countries accounted 
for a quarter (25.8 percent) of China’s total imports in the first quarter of 2018.300 While 
the percentage of trade seems high, it is focused on a small group of BRI countries, with 
only ten accounting for a bulk of the trade.301 Of those, Vietnam, Malaysia, Russia, 
Indonesia, and Thailand accounted for 66.4 percent and 73.3 percent  of China’s export 
and import flows, respectively.302 China is Pakistan’s second largest export partner, after 
the United States, and accounts for nearly eight percent of Pakistan’s exports.303 However, 
Pakistan recently became the biggest destination for Chinese goods, accounting for 
29 percent of total imports.304 
Non-monetary overseas direct investment in the first quarter of 2018 to $U.S. 3.6 
billion, but were above 2017 quarter one levels.305 Similar to export and import flows, 
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only a few countries enjoy the bulk of Chinese overseas direct investment, including 
Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.306 Concessional loans fell by 7.4 percent in 
the first quarter of 2018, which may suggest that Chinese state banks are adopting more 
strict or prudent loan terms for BRI countries.307 This is concurrent with Chinese bankers 
and economists who urged caution with China lending large sums to countries with poor 
credit ratings and which are at high risk of default. The Chief Investment Officer of one of 
China’s largest state banks stated that he preferred to loan to western countries because the 
return on investment is safe and good.308 The same officer said he only allocates the 
minimum amount and only when ordered to invest in BRI countries, due to the risks 
associated with lending to countries with poor credit ratings and governance issues.309 
There is also the risk of adding non-performing BRI loans to China’s already sizable debt 
after the 2008 stimulus package China used to buoy its economy during the global financial 
crisis.310 
D. CONCLUSION 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative is aimed at ensuring access to markets, resources, 
and long-term economic growth. Recognizing that China’s economic rise has not been 
equal, a goal is to spread economic growth and development to China’s interior, which has 
been left behind for the last six decades while the eastern coastal areas have experienced 
rapid economic growth, wage and quality of life increases. The former Chinese ambassador 
to Pakistan, Lu Shuling argues that poverty is the main driving factor for the insurgency 
and separatism that exists both in Pakistan and Xinjiang.311 He further argues that the 
economic development that will result from BRI and CPEC in China’s southwest frontiers, 
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as well as regionally will help combat these ills.312 While poverty is a part of separatist or 
insurgent motives, this argument ignores the ethnic conflict that exists both in Baluchistan 
and Xinjiang, and the real and perceived ethnic, religious, and cultural discrimination 
experienced by ethnic minorities in China and Pakistan. 
The BRI is also China’s answer to the middle income trap and Chinese 
policymakers desire to move up the value chain to become a service-based economy. 
Access to resources and markets are of concern for China, as its economy is forecasted to 
grow by 6.6 percent in 2018.313 Its economy is still heavily leveraged toward 
manufacturing, which requires continued access to oil. In 2010 China surpassed the United 
States as the world’s largest energy consumer, and consuming one fifth of the world’s 
energy by 2014.314  
Over the last several years China has desired and is attempting to move away from 
an export-oriented manufacturing economy to a more service-based economy in an attempt 
to escape the middle income trap and promote long term economic growth. China 
manufacturing comparative advantage of cheap labor has diminished as economic growth 
has increased wages.315 China has begun initiatives such as the “Made in China 2025,” a 
manufacturing industry upgrade push to restructure China’s manufacturing industry, make 
it more innovation-driven, emphasize quality over quantity, and to offload its excess 
capacity.316 The BRI initiative is expected to play a major role in the exporting of higher-
end Chinese goods regionally.317 While Beijing denies them, accusations by European and 
other Western companies that China is skewing the playing field in favor of Chinese 
companies or outright advantaging domestic firms has drawn criticism from abroad.318  
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The Chinese manufacturing sector is suffering from excess capacity in heavy 
industries such as steel and cement as a result from the stimulus package Beijing used to 
buoy the economy during the 2008 global financial crisis.319 Entire cities were built, and 
now sit empty, as Chinese economic policymakers injected money in the form of loans to 
local governments to keep unemployment down and manufacturing up. This excess 
capacity places a drag on economies and hinders growth, thus China is seeking to offload 
it.  
What constitutes a BRI project has not been clearly defined, and coupled with a 
lack of transparency and the long-term nature of infrastructure projects, analysis of BRI 
projects are difficult. Yet BRI is more than just infrastructure. Economic interconnectivity 
through trade and investment are also included in BRI. Trade between China and the BRI 
countries increased nearly 20 percent in the last six months, with exports and imports in 
this same period growing by 16.5 percent and 23.2 percent, respectively.320 The BRI 
countries accounted for nearly a third of China’s total exports and a quarter of its imports 
in the first quarter of 2018.321 While the percentage of trade seems high, it is focused on a 
small group of BRI countries, with Vietnam, Malaysia, Russia, Indonesia, and Thailand 
constituting the bulk. 
The reduction in concessional loans in the first quarter of 2018 suggests that 
Chinese state banks are adopting more strict or prudent loan terms for BRI countries, 
especially those with below investible credit ratings.322 This is concurrent with Chinese 
bankers and economists who urged caution with China lending large sums to countries with 
poor credit ratings and which are at high risk of default. Leading Chinese officials from 
economic institutions have been concerned that loans to these countries with bad credit 
ratings are too risky, and that they stated preferred to loan to western countries because the 
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return on investment is safe and good.323 There is also the risk of adding non-performing 
BRI loans to China’s already sizable debt after the 2008 stimulus package China used to 
buoy its economy during the global financial crisis.324 
Chinese officials refute the assertation that the BRI is the Chinese Marshall Plan. 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that BRI is not like the Marshall Plan, which was a “tool 
of geopolitics,” but rather BRI is “a product of inclusive cooperation...and must not be 
viewed with the outdated Cold War mentality.”325 While the Marshall plan did 
reinvigorate and rebuild Europe’s destroyed economies and infrastructure, and as a result 
helped establish a world order in which the United States benefits significantly from, China 
seeks to sell the BRI as a “win-win” for all parties involved, through trade, infrastructure, 
and economic development, and not as a geopolitical tool.326  
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V. CONCLUSION  
China’s Belt and Road Initiative is arguably the most ambitious trade and 
infrastructure building campaign in history. Spanning Asia, Eurasia, Europe, the Middle 
East and Africa, the BRI spans the globe. This interconnected network of rail lines, oil and 
gas pipelines, roads, bridges, port facilities and trade agreements are designed to connect 
China to markets in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Africa.327 The flagship project of 
China’s BRI is the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, a network of highways, rail lines, 
fiber optic cables, and free trade zones physically connecting China’s Xinjiang Province 
with Pakistan. This Corridor is anchored on the Arabian Sea by Gwadar Port, in the restive 
Pakistani province of Baluchistan. This initiative is also designed to provide China with 
continued access to energy and resources in order to promote and continue Chinese 
economic growth. Complicating analysis of BRI projects is that there has yet to be an 
agreed upon definition of what constitutes a BRI project.328 Transparency of projects and 
their progress is also an issue, as is the long-term nature of infrastructure projects. Critics 
argue that while economic benefits for China are inarguable, the real motivation behind the 
BRI is a geopolitical tool that will be used to exert Chinese influence globally, enhance 
internal and external security, and reestablish a new global order that is more beneficial to 
China. This thesis examined the explanatory power of the security and economic drivers 
of the BRI and CPEC in Chapters III and IV, respectively. While the economic drivers are 
undoubtedly valid and important, unanswered questions remain. China is investing in some 
countries with the highest risk of default, according to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. If the primary BRI driver is economic, this debt risk makes 
little sense. The Chinese Communist Party derives much of its legitimacy on economic 
performance. Yet this is primarily driven by the desire to stay in power, not by altruism. 
As the CCP desires to stay in power, internal security is paramount. Internal security 
spending increased significantly between 2017 and 2018, with Xinjiang seeing nearly a 93 
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percent increase during that time.329 This region is considered especially problematic as it 
physically links China and Pakistan, is populated by the Muslim Uighur minority, and has 
seen violent attacks on security personnel and citizens over the last fifteen years. This focus 
on internal security spending and to retain the reins of power sufficiently point to security 
as the primary driver for these initiatives. Economics might be the means, but security is 
the ends. 
While not originally conceived as a BRI project since many aspects predate the 
initiative, the flagship project of BRI is the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, anchored 
by Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea. This corridor also consists of rail lines, roads, fiber 
optic networks, free trade zones, and port facilities, designed to invigorate Pakistan’s 
economy, providing China with access to a warm water port which bypasses the Strait of 
Malacca, and solving China’s Malacca Dilemma. However, the port of Gwadar resides in 
Baluchistan, a restive province where violence is common and ethnic tensions are high. 
Attacks on Pakistani security forces occur, as do attacks on Chinese workers in Pakistan.330 
As the flagship project, China will rely on the success of CPEC to further sell the overall 
BRI as well as projects to countries who may otherwise be unsure of BRI’s viability. 
The arguments for China’s motivation for BRI fall into two main categories: 
economic focused and security. China seeks to advertise BRI as a mutually beneficial 
initiative to achieve win-win outcomes, according to the spokesman for the 13th Party 
Congress, Zhang Yesui.331 China disputes the framing of BRI as a geostrategic tool but 
claims that all participants in the initiative are equal partners.332 China has not been 
reserved about stating that the BRI will be very beneficial to them, including the assertion 
by Chinese scholars that the BRI is designed to internationalize the Renminbi by utilizing 
it as the currency for initiative transactions to challenge to U.S. Dollar.333 The front-page 
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manifesto in the People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party 
stated that China is needed by the world, and they should use the global environment to 
“gain an advantage” is causing concern in neighboring countries that China is beginning a 
neocolonial push across the globe.334  
China desires to move its economy up the value chain from low-end manufactured 
goods to high-end manufactured goods and services through its “Made in China 2025” 
program. Its economy is still heavily reliant on low-end manufacturing which requires 
consistent and increasing access to resources, especially oil. This oil requirement impacted 
China’s foreign policy after 1993 when it became a net importer of oil.335 China became 
the world’s largest energy consumer in 2010, and by 2020 China estimates it will need to 
import nearly two thirds of its oil.336 Nearly eighty percent of China’s oil imports flow 
through the Strait of Malacca, a strategic waterway that is one of the busiest in the 
world.337 China sees this reliance on a narrow waterway as a strategic vulnerability dubbed 
the Malacca Dilemma. If an actor such as the United States takes actions to shut down the 
Malacca Strait, it could be detrimental to China’s economy and security. The Belt and Road 
Initiative, and CPEC in particular is China’s answer to this perceived dilemma. Utilizing 
Gwadar Port, CPEC and BRI’s road networks and pipelines, Chinese policy makers believe 
they can mitigate the Malacca Dilemma, though the mitigation is costly as it is estimated 
that it costs four to five times more to send oil over land from Gwadar to Xinjiang than by 
sea to Shanghai.338  
Examining where China is investing suggests that economics is not the underlying 
motivation for BRI. If this initiative was purely economic in nature, China would invest in 
countries with lower risks of default and higher credit ratings. However, China has invested 
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in countries with the highest risks of default, which suffer from significant economic and 
governance issues. Some of the BRI countries have credit ratings below investable grade, 
and some Chinese banks are worried about risky loans to these countries as well as the 
long-term viability of some BRI projects.339 Chinese bankers have privately voiced 
concern that these massive initiatives could create another global economic crisis, and 
worry that poorer countries could take advantage of China by getting loans for projects 
with no intention of repaying them.340 Loaning to countries at high risk for default does 
not make economic sense, thus pointing to another explanation.  
The thrust of BRI out of China is focused on the southwest frontiers, an area which 
China has historically felt a shaky grip on power and an area China views as its “soft 
underbelly.”341 Xinjiang, as well as Pakistan are of concern to Beijing as unrest and a shift 
in Uighur sentiment from secular to Islamist in Xinjiang is linked to Pakistan.342 An 
unstable Pakistan poses increasing risk to China, as China perceives that Uighurs have and 
are traveling to Pakistan for radicalization and then return to Xinjiang and perpetuate acts 
of violence.343 Xi Jinping argued that religious extremism is a direct threat to China, as 
extremists and separatists could flow into Xinjiang with a goal to weaken China.344  
A testament to China’s concern for security, the Chinese Communist Party spends 
more annually on internal security than any other area, totaling nearly US$200 billion last 
year.345 The Tibetan Autonomous Region receives the largest amount of domestic security 
spending, Xinjiang is second and saw a 92.8 percent increase in domestic security spending 
between 2017 and 2018.346 When adjusted for Purchasing Power parity, both Xinjiang and 
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the Tibetan Autonomous Region exceed U.S. domestic security spending by 32 and 37 
percent, respectively.347 This focus on internal security was also featured in Xi Jinping’s 
speech at the 19th Party Congress. Chinese economic development since the Deng Xiaoping 
era has been uneven and has favored large coastal cities, leaving behind the interior and 
outlying provinces. China advertises that BRI will raise the standard of living in these areas 
and claims the BRI will address chronic underdevelopment but it isn’t driven by a desire 
to raise the standard of living for all Chinese citizens, but rather it is based on a quest for 
security and to placate the ethnic minority populations living there and maintain a grip on 
power.348 
China’s BRI offers challenges and opportunities to the United States. If BRI is 
successful in the long-term, China could overtake the United States are the world’s largest 
economy. Chinese influence increasing globally could upend U.S. power, affecting 
military and diplomatic efforts abroad. China’s BRI, if successful will allow China to set 
the conditions and rules for global trade. The United States was in the position to ensure it 
would continue to set global trade rules by its membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
(TPP) a twelve country free trade agreement that covered 40 percent of the global 
economy.349 Upon its withdrawal from the TPP, the United States opened the door for 
China and its BRI to assume the role as rule-maker. The BRI is “‘a vehicle for China to 
write new rules, establish institutions that reflect Chinese interests, and reshape ‘soft’ 
infrastructure.’”350 A balance to China’s BRI should be the United States’ reentrance into 
the TPP, continued maintenance of alliances both in the Asia Pacific as well as in countries 
along China’s Belt and Road. Should Gwadar be used as a base for China’s People’s 
Liberation Army Navy in the future could complicate the United States Navy operations in 
the region. It could also be problematic for both the Pakistani navy and the PLAN, as 
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Baluchistan remains an unwelcoming environment for them, and could lead to addition 
attacks on those forces. The United States should engage Pakistan as a partner in trade and 
global security. The improvement of Pakistan’s economy is beneficial globally, as it 
improves quality of life, the human development index, and can help reduce extremist 
recruitment by removing the recruiting points of poverty, lack of economic and social 
mobility, and alienation. The BRI and CPEC should not be ignored by the United States, 
as doing so would allow room for China to establish the global rules of trade. This would 
risk the United States losing its global position, and risk imbalanced trade rules worldwide.  
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